THE TURNING POINT IN IRAQ?

The turning point in the quest for a representative republic in Iraq?

This may have happened when the Kurds changed sides recently in the Iraqi parliament and are allies with the Sunnis and secular political parties.

Of course, other factors may still prevent the rise of a secular republic in Iraq that is the outcome favored by the USA, or a plunge into civil war between the various factions, but it would appear that good reasons for a postive outcome exists, as noted by an American columnist, Charles Krauthammer of THE NEW YORK TIMES, and Ali of Baghdad writing in his Blog, "A Free Iraq."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/09/AR2006030902195.html

The Kurd Card

By Charles Krauthammer

Friday, March 10, 2006; Page A19

Lost amid the news of all the bloodletting in Iraq is an important political development: The Kurds have switched sides. In the first parliament after the first set of elections, they allied themselves with the Shiite slate to produce the current Shiite-dominated government led by Ibrahim al-Jafari.

Now the Kurds have joined with the opposition Sunni and secular parties to oppose the Shiite bloc. The result is two large competing coalitions: (a) the Kurd-Sunni-secular bloc, which controls about 140 seats in the 275-seat parliament and would constitute the barest majority, and (b) the Shiite bloc, which itself is a coalition of seven not-always-friendly parties and controls 130 seats, slightly less than a majority.

If only it were that simple, Iraq would have a new, secular-oriented government. But to protect minorities and force the creation of large governing coalitions, the Iraqi constitution essentially requires a two-thirds majority to form a government.

If we had that requirement in the United States, we might still be trying to settle the 2000 election. In Iraq, the result for now is stalemate, which could lead to disaster if the whole system disintegrates because of the impasse. Or it could lead to a more effective, less sectarian government than Jafari's.

The key question is who is going to control the two critical ministries: interior and defense. In Iraq, as in much of the world, interior does not control the national parks. It controls the police. And under the current government it has been under Shiite control and infiltrated by extreme Shiite militias. Some of these militias launched vicious reprisal raids against Sunnis after the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, jeopardizing the entire project of a national police force exercising legitimate authority throughout the country.

The main objective of U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who worked miracles in Afghanistan, is to make sure that the Interior Ministry is purged of sectarianism by giving it to some neutral figure, perhaps a secular Sunni with no ties to the Baath Party. Similarly with the Defense Ministry, which controls the army. The army has, by most accounts, handled itself well following the mosque bombing and subsequent riots, and it has acted as a reliably national institution. It is essential that it not get into sectarian hands.

Political success in Iraq rests heavily on these two institutions. Which is why these negotiations, tiresome and endless as they seem, are so important.

The immediate issue is the prime ministership. An internal ballot among the Shiite bloc brought, by a single vote, another term for Jafari. The critical vote putting him over the top was the faction controlled by Moqtada al-Sadr, the radically anti-American and pro-Tehran cleric whose home base is the Shiite slums of Baghdad. For Sadr, a weak and corruption-ridden government that allows conditions to deteriorate would be the perfect prelude to his gaining power.

Not all parts of the Shiite coalition are happy either with Jafari's ineffectiveness or with his political dependence on Sadr. Splits are already appearing in that uneasy alliance. But the most important challenge to Jafari is the Kurds. They are wary of Sadr and unhappy with Jafari, under whom everything -- services, security, trust -- is deteriorating.

Admittedly, part of their calculation is sectarian. This is, after all, Iraq. Jafari has impeded Kurdish claims on Kirkuk and infuriated the Kurds by traveling to Turkey (which opposes all Kurdish ambitions) without their approval and with a traveling party that did not include a single Kurd.

The Kurd-Sunni-secular bloc wants a new prime minister who will establish a national unity government. Because the United States wants precisely the same outcome, the Kurd defection is very good news in a landscape of almost unrelenting bad news. The other good news is a split in the Shiite bloc, with a near-majority that favors a more technocratic prime minister and is chafing at Sadr's influence. Additionally, the Sunni insurgency is in the midst of its own internecine strife between the local ex-Baathists, who are not particularly religious and want power, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's foreign jihadists, for whom killing Shiites combines sport and religion and who care not a whit for the future of the country. There are numerous reports of Sunni tribes declaring war on these foreign jihadists and of firefights between them.

The security situation is grim and the neighboring powers malign. The one hope for success in Iraq is political. The Kurdish defection has produced the current impasse. That impasse has contributed to the mood of despair here at home. But the defection holds open the best possibility for political success: an effective, broad-based national unity government that, during its mandatory four-year term, presides over an American withdrawal.

http://afreeiraqi.blogspot.com/

Friday, March 10, 2006

Signs of hope.

Before Ja'fari's last visit to Turkey everything was going in the wrong direction and the only hope I could see was that a civil war may resolve most of those unsettled issues and repressed anger and distrust that has been building among different Iraqi sects. The politicians were not doing what they should do and the people were just following those their leaders who were already lost, so the only hope was in that the people would wake up on their own, but that needs a huge shock, as obviously Saddam, the war, and what followed were not enough to change the hearts and minds enough to push forward to a real change.

However, someone very stupid (or very smart?) seem to have advised Ja'fari that it's a good plan to visit Turkey these days, and then not inform the Kurds and take along with him some Turkmen figures who have no real official position in the government. That was enough for the Kurds to practically change sides and stand with the Sunni bloc and Allawi to demand that the UIA replace his nominee for the prime minister position.

None of those blocs can be really considered a liberal democratic one, but collectively they, for the 1st time seem to be working well and that include the UIA. Adil Abdil Mehdi is not much better than Ja'fari but he's still a better choice for the moment. I tend to see the Sadirists as a much bigger threat to Iraq's unity than the SCIRI and despite (or probably because) their alliance with radical Sunnis, they are more likely to further widen the split between Sunnis and She'at. Ask any Sunni who they distrust more and they will answer Al-Mehdi army. Ask any She'at who they distrust more among Sunnis and they'd say the Association of Sunni scholars, Sadr allies.

Another reason why replacing Ja'fari is a good thing is that it most likely going to deepen the already existing disagreement between Sadr and Al-Hakeem, the strongest men in the UIA. Sistani has always managed to keep them together like when the cause of conflict was opening an office for Sadr in Najaf, but now the dispute is about something much bigger than that.

If the UIA is not worse than the rest then why is it good that it get weakened? Simply to create a balance where none of the involved political powers can have things totally their way. To me of course the UIA is worse than Allawi and even the Sunni bloc but a She'at may not see it the same of course. However, what am I going to lose if no one dominates the parliament and what would a Kurd or a She'at lose if their groups don't dominate? Nothing, except absolute power and the chance to dominate and oppress other sects which I believe is not what most Iraqis want.

Now the UIA may not submit to the demands of the other sects and that would bring us back to civil war if the Kurds maintained their current stand.I have been thinking since the 1st elections that Iraq's main hope lay in the way the Kurdish Alliance act and how much would they be involved in Iraq's politics as a whole country and not just when it comes to Kurdistan. The Kurds have fewer reasons to disagree with Sunnis or She'at than those two have to disagree with each. They're mostly Sunnis and that makes Sunnis less sensitive towards them and they were subject to oppression and discrimination just like the She'at which makes it easier that they communicate and understand each other.

If the UIA agrees on changing their nominee this may give rise to a more balanced government that most Iraqis would support and this would mean that dealing with Sunni insurgency would be easier and then dealing with She'at militias would be more possible too. How is a government led by a member of the SCIRI going to agree to disband the militia? Seems impossible but it doesn't have to be that radical and doesn't have to include all militias. The SCIRI would be more than happy to see the Mehdi army disarmed and Sistani may not object that much too if it can be done in a smart way. The new Iraqi government may try to enforce it on all including the Peshmarga but then all the Peshmarga and the Badr brigade may need to do is keep a low profile.

The Mehdi army most likely won't be able to do that, as while the Peshmerga functions only in Kurdistan and have no reason to be that active or aggressive and the Badr brigade has to always keep a low profile because it can't survive if its actions were shown to the public. The Mehdi army survives only with chaos and tension and they often create those by themselves. They would also be found unjustified in creating any sectarian tension if the Sunni insurgency gets dealt with by the government which would be Sunni in part and wouldn't find it as difficult as it is now to gain the support of locals in Sunni areas. After the Mehdi army get dealt with, the rest shouldn't be that difficult.

Probably just a wishful thinking on my side but I don't think anyone can say that it's impossible.